

TASK FORCE 5-5 CAVALRY SUMMARY OF EVENTS

On 2 January 1991, the Battalion Main Body deployed to Southwest Asia. After arrival at King Fahd Military Airport in Jabal, Saudia Arabia, the Battalion was sent to "Cement City", King Abdual Aziz Port, Dahman, Saudia Arabia to await arrival of the equipment arriving by sea transport. The battalion conducted acclimation training and off loaded, reconfigured and painted vehicles.

The Battalion began movement to FAA Henry on 17 January 1991 with trail element arriving on 9 February 1991. In TAA HENRY, the battalion task organized with 4-32 AR and continued precombat preparations, gunnery and rehearsals. On 18 February 1991, the task force moved with the rest of the 3d Armored Division to FAA BUTTS.

The Division Plan called for a tactical movement of over 300km with refuel stops enroute to OBJ COLLINS. Part of the CG's intent was to ensure that the 1045 vehicles from the D-Rear / DISCOM element advanced safe from enemy counterattacks to the flanks, safe from Lines of Communication interdiction, and were in a position to support the Division. To accomplish this Task Force 5-5 was attached to D-Rear on 17 Feb 91 (G-7). The task force was responsible for following and supporting the division's attack, conducting a screen on the division's eastern flank, and defeating any counterattacks from the flanks or rear. Upon completion of this mission, Task Force 5-5 was to be attached to the 1st Brigade vicinity OBJ COLLINS. On 23 Feb 91 (G-1), the task force published its final revision to its OPORD. Task Force 5-5 task organization for the attack can be found at Annex 1.

The Task Force initiated movement from TAA HENRY to FAA BAYONET (BUTTS) at 161800 Feb 91 (G-6). Task Force moved in diamond formation and closed on FAA BAYONET at 171600 Feb 91 (G-5). Task Force maintained its unit integrity during the movement and arrived with all its combat power.

At 241200 Feb 91 (G-DAY), Task Force 5-5 moved from FAA Bayonet, conducted passage of TAP Line Road and reformed into a diamond formation north of the passage point. Task Force continued to move as a single element until approximately 20 km. south of LD. At this point Task Force split into two elements Team Riess and Task Force(-). Breakdown of these elements is at Annex 2. Task Force(-) would screen the Division right flank with Team Riess leading the DREAR center of sector.

At approximately 250830 Feb 91 (G+1), both Task Force(-) and Team Riess crossed the LD. Task Force(-), under the control of the S-3, conducted the screen of the division's right flank from 4-7 CAV to D-Rear. Team Riess, under the control of the battalion executive officer, moved center of the division axis of advance and led D-Rear elements north. Team Riess protected and guided D-Rear elements around and through numerous areas of slow-go/no-go terrain. Task Force(-) maintained contact with the 4-7 CAV encountered enemy dismount elements and apprehended 35 EPWs from the eastern flank.

At approximately 260001 Feb 91 (G+2), Task Force(-) linked up with Team Riess vicinity Phase Line Berlin. Task Force 5-5 continued to move north and secured the Division Support Area vicinity Phase Line MALTA. At 261700 Feb 91, Task Force 5-5 was reattached to 1st Brigade Task Force 5-5 continued to move northeast to vicinity Phase Line Rifle and at 262030 Feb 91, was detached from 1st Brigade and this time attached to 3d Brigade See Annex 3. At 271930 Feb 91 (G+3), Task Force 5-5, while moving as the Brigade reserve for the division main effort, made contact with the enemy vicinity Phase Line PLUM. The Task Force received small arms and RPG fire and was successful in engaging and destroying 2 x T-62, 1 x T-55, 1 x BMP, and one bunker. Task Force 5-5 had no casualties and 30 EPWs were apprehended. Task Force 5-5 continued the attack and destroyed 1 x T-62 and 2 x BMPs enroute to OBJ MINDON. While occupying OBJ MINDON, Task Force 5-5 destroyed an additional T-62. See Annex 4 (*editorial note: we do not yet have a copy of Annexes 1 through 4*).

At 280630 Feb 91 (G+4) while preparing to continue the attack, Task Force 5-5 received a change of mission to clear in zone from Phase Line LEMON to Phase Line PLUM. This operation continued through 1 Mar 91. Twenty-one EPWs were captured. Battle Damage summary is included as Annex 5. Task Force 5-5 continues to maintain a defensive posture with focus on PCI, sustaining the force, and conducting AARs to develop lessons learned.

Following completion of destruction of enemy equipment vicinity of OBJ MINDON, Task Force 5-5 was returned to RFCT control. On 15 March 1991, the Task Force received a warning order to move northeast and conduct a relief in place near SAFWAN, IRAQ. The Task Force Commander conducted his recon on 16 March 1991 and the Task Force TAC collocated with the RFCT TAC to coordinate operations. The leaders' recon was conducted 17 MAR 1991 and the OPOD issued on 18 March 1991. Task Force 5-5 moved north from OBJ MINDON to conduct a relief in place of 1/34 AR, 1st ID north of SAFWAN, IRAQI. The Task Force advance party including the TOC, moved into position the evening of 19 March with the Main Body closing in sector on 20 March 1991. Task Force 5-5 assumed duties of Check Point CHARLIE, the main crossing point on Highway 8. Highway 8 is the main highway between KUWAIT CITY, KUWAIT and AL BASRAH, IRAQ. During this time, Charlie Company ran CP C with an MP platoon and 3 interpreters from the Utah Army National Guard. The Scout Platoon ran the Task Force EPW collection point and transported EPWs to the Brigade EPW collection point. An event summary is in Annex 6.

On 17 April 1991, Task Force 5-5 adjusted sector to the west with D/4-32 Armor anchoring the right flank on Highway 8; A/5-5 at the SAFWAN Air Field; B/5-5 and D/5-5 in the center and the Scout platoon screening the right flank and manning a contact point with 5-18 IN (SPARTANS) from 3d Brigade. C/5-5 was attached to 4-32 AR effective 181200 APR91. Current operations included patrolling in sector, preparation for relief by UN forces and continued humanitarian relief effort.

On 26 April 1991, the Task Force received the mission to secure the Safwan Airfield, and prepare to move by air Iraqi refugees from the Safwan refugee camp to a temporary resettlement camp vicinity Rafa, Saudi Arabia. On 27 April, a Departure Airfield Command Group (DACG) was established by the Battalion S-3 and Air Liaison coordination element (ALICE) from Riyadh, Saudia Arabia commanded by CPT Winston Churchill, USAF. Alpha Company continued to secure the airfield, Bravo Company established a holding site on the airfield constructed by B/12 EN and A/23 EN. All other Battalion elements continued security operations with the United Nations buffer zone in southern Iraq. Airfield operations were complete on 7 May 1991. Summary of evacuation is Annex 7.

On 7 May 1991, Task Force 5-5 Advance party departed for Kuwait City and KKMC for redeployment. On 7 May the Task Force moved to AA SAM in northern Kuwait. The Task force reconfigured pure and began turn in of remaining ammunition and transfer of equipment to other 1st Brigade units. On 10 May 1991, the battalion redeployed by three means to King Kahld Military City, Saudia Arabia. All wheeled vehicles moved by convoy, tracked vehicles moved by HETTs and personnel flew out of Kuwait International Airport, Kuwait City, Kuwait. Upon arrival in RAA ROSE, the Battalion began preparation for turn in of all TO & E equipment for POMCUS. Upon completion of equipment turn in, On 19 and 20 May 1991, the battalion redeployed to Rhein Main Air Base, Frankfurt, FRG.

**ANNEX 5
BDA SUMMARY**

| TYPE OF EQUIPMENT | DIRECT FIRE/WPN | DEMO | TOTAL DESTROYED |
|--------------------------|------------------------|-------------|------------------------|
| T-72 | | 2 | 2 |
| T-62 | 3/TOW 2/120MM | 17 | 22 |
| T-54/55/69 | 1 TOW | 36 | 37 |
| BMP | 3/25MM | 22 | 25 |
| BRDM | | 6 | 6 |
| MTLB | | 4 | 4 |
| ZSU 23-4 | | 4 | 4 |
| SELF PROPELLED ARTILLERY | | 16 | 16 |
| ARTILLERY PIECES | | 24 | 24 |
| TRACK RECOVERY VEHICLES | | 1 | 1 |
| ENG TRUCKS | | 3 | 3 |
| BUCKET LOADERS | | 2 | 2 |
| TRUCKS | | 10 | 10 |
| JEEPS | | 2 | 2 |
| MOTORCYCLES | | 2 | 2 |
| TRAILERS | | 2 | 2 |
| BUNKERS | 1 | 4 | 5 |
| BUNKER COMPLEX | | 1 | 1 |

EPW's: 86 TOTAL CAPTURED

ANNEX 6
5-5 CAVALRY (BAYONETS) DAILY SUMMARY

| DATE | NORTH | | SOUTH | | POW | PATIENTS SEEN | RANDOM SMALL ARMS FIRE | ASYLUM SEEKERS | CASES MRE'S | CASES WATER |
|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-----|---------------|------------------------|----------------|-------------|-------------|
| | VEH | PAX | VEH | PAX | | | | | | |
| 20 | 145 | 121 | --- | 9 | 12 | 2 | 0 | -- | -- | -- |
| 21 | 106 | 102 | --- | 22 | 28 | 8 | 3 | -- | -- | -- |
| 22 | 457 | 500 | 375 | 548 | 26 | 20 | 5 | 0 | 10 | 10 |
| 23 | 237 | 267 | 338 | 358 | 29 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 12 |
| 24 | 219 | 244 | 137 | 153 | 35 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 12 |
| 25 | 250 | 434 | 214 | 642 | 50 | 13 | 4 | 10 | 35 | 22 |
| 26 | 135 | 1210 | 288 | 744 | 38 | 45 | 4 | 7 | 24 | 12 |
| 27 | 263 | 882 | 256 | 892 | 43 | 47 | 4 | 1 | 12 | 10 |
| 28 | 285 | 1779 | 314 | 1738 | 34 | 52 | 3 | 9 | 7 | 7 |
| 29 | 290 | 1911 | 320 | 2033 | 54 | 61 | 3 | 7 | 20 | 20 |
| 30 | 158 | 919 | 244 | 1125 | 62 | 74 | 1 | 6 | 22 | 22 |
| 31 | 152 | 782 | 165 | 646 | 60 | 45 | 1 | 0 | 10 | 10 |
| 1 | 117 | 565 | 174 | 659 | 40 | 52 | 1 | 3 | 13 | 12 |
| 2 | 140 | 697 | 197 | 760 | 31 | 85 | 1 | 9 | 8 | 12 |
| 3 | 154 | 521 | 258 | 662 | 55 | 62 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 11 |
| 4 | 118 | 579 | 128 | 527 | 24 | 68 | 2 | 0 | 17 | 12 |
| 5 | 114 | 439 | 122 | 422 | 9 | 45 | 1 | 0 | 7 | 6 |
| 6 | 172 | 411 | 157 | 662 | 21 | 57 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 5 |
| 7 | 215 | 844 | 206 | 831 | 39 | 64 | 4 | 0 | 13 | 10 |
| 8 | 215 | 1017 | 197 | 889 | 30 | 69 | 2 | 0 | 8 | 7 |
| 9 | 218 | 780 | 209 | 893 | 13 | 66 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 6 |
| 10 | 222 | 772 | 194 | 792 | 5 | 61 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 11 | 195 | 671 | 202 | 735 | 22 | 95 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 3 |
| 12 | 90 | 366 | 124 | 529 | 0 | 61 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 5 |
| 13 | 115 | 394 | 115 | 330 | 0 | 75 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 2 |
| 14 | 95 | 525 | 118 | 400 | 0 | 40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| -- | 4937 | 19899 | 5303 | 18070 | 741 | 1354 | 57 | 55 | 285 | 220 |

**ANNEX 7
REFUGEE EVACUATION SUMMARY**

28 April 1991

| FLIGHT # | #FAM | #SINGLE | #MALE | #FEMALE | #CHILDREN | TOTAL |
|-----------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|------------------|--------------|
| 28-1-1688 | 12 | 8 | 26 | 15 | 19 | 68 |
| 28-2-0209 | 7 | 12 | 22 | 9 | 25 | 68 |
| 28-3-1398 | 6 | 7 | 27 | 14 | 18 | 66 |
| 28-4-7880 | 8 | 11 | 23 | 7 | 27 | 68 |
| 28-5-7846 | 8 | 5 | 28 | 12 | 24 | 69 |
| TOTAL | 41 | 43 | 126 | 57 | 111 | 339 |

29 APRIL 1991

| FLIGHT # | #FAM | #SINGLE | #MALE | #FEMALE | #CHILD | TOTAL |
|-----------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|
| 29-1-7880 | 0 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 |
| 29-2-1290 | 11 | 10 | 29 | 21 | 29 | 89 |
| 29-3-0524 | 9 | 0 | 34 | 14 | 30 | 78 |
| 29-4-7879 | 10 | 1 | 30 | 19 | 29 | 79 |
| 29-5-0207 | 8 | 4 | 33 | 15 | 31 | 83 |
| 29-6-1820 | 12 | 0 | 28 | 25 | 28 | 81 |
| 29-7-1688 | 7 | 5 | 34 | 22 | 24 | 85 |
| 29-8-1391 | 7 | 43 | 16 | 14 | 15 | 88 |
| TOTAL | 64 | 143 | 204 | 130 | 186 | 663 |

30 APRIL 1991

| FLIGHT # | #FAM | #SINGLE | #MALE | #FEMALE | #CHILD | TOTAL |
|-----------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|
| 30-1-1398 | 0 | 82 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 82 |
| 30-2-1688 | 0 | 84 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 84 |
| 30-3-1391 | 0 | 84 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 84 |
| 30-4-1667 | 7 | 0 | 18 | 21 | 42 | 81 |
| 30-5-7803 | 5 | 4 | 39 | 18 | 30 | 91 |
| 30-6-0964 | 3 | 6 | 24 | 22 | 39 | 91 |
| 30-7-1288 | 6 | 17 | 27 | 19 | 24 | 87 |
| 30-8-1688 | 8 | 0 | 34 | 22 | 26 | 82 |
| 30-9-1391 | 5 | 5 | 17 | 21 | 37 | 80 |
| 30-10-1667 | 0 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 |
| 30-11-7803 | 6 | 6 | 30 | 20 | 24 | 80 |
| 30-12-0964 | 0 | 78 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 78 |
| TOTAL | 40 | 446 | 189 | 143 | 222 | 1000 |

1 MAY 1991

| FLIGHT # | #FAM | #SINGLE | #MALE | #FEMALE | #CHILD | TOTAL |
|------------|------|---------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| 01-1-1290 | 10 | 2 | 26 | 24 | 28 | 80 |
| 01-2-7803 | 0 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 |
| 01-3-0964 | 10 | 1 | 43 | 13 | 23 | 80 |
| 01-4-1398 | 10 | 10 | 28 | 17 | 38 | 93 |
| 01-5-1688 | 6 | 8 | 25 | 21 | 31 | 85 |
| 01-6-1667 | 0 | 82 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 82 |
| 01-7-0209 | 8 | 9 | 34 | 23 | 21 | 87 |
| 01-8-7803 | 13 | 5 | 29 | 23 | 28 | 85 |
| 01-9-0964 | 6 | 3 | 28 | 19 | 33 | 83 |
| 01-10-1688 | 8 | 3 | 17 | 25 | 38 | 83 |
| 01-11-1667 | 8 | 2 | 20 | 20 | 40 | 82 |
| 01-12-0209 | 0 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 |
| TOTAL | 79 | 285 | 250 | 185 | 280 | 1000 |

3 MAY 1991

| FLIGHT # | #FAM | #SINGLE | #MALE | #FEMALE | #CHILD | TOTAL |
|------------|------|---------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| 03-1-7791 | 0 | 83 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 83 |
| 03-2-0964 | 7 | 9 | 28 | 17 | 32 | 86 |
| 03-3-0964 | 5 | 9 | 25 | 20 | 32 | 86 |
| 03-4-1398 | 9 | 10 | 29 | 16 | 31 | 86 |
| 03-5-1688 | 6 | 8 | 30 | 18 | 30 | 86 |
| 03-6-1667 | 8 | 11 | 31 | 19 | 25 | 86 |
| 03-7-0209 | 0 | 81 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 81 |
| 03-8-7803 | 6 | 17 | 21 | 19 | 33 | 90 |
| 03-9-0964 | 11 | 13 | 21 | 21 | 35 | 90 |
| 03-10-1688 | 8 | 13 | 21 | 20 | 36 | 90 |
| 03-11-1667 | 12 | 13 | 21 | 24 | 32 | 90 |
| 03-12-0209 | 7 | 11 | 21 | 17 | 31 | 80 |
| TOTAL | 79 | 278 | 248 | 191 | 317 | 1034 |

4 MAY 1991

| FLIGHT # | #FAM | #SINGLE | #MALE | #FEMALE | #CHILD | TOTAL |
|------------|------|---------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| 04-1-0964 | 0 | 80 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 80 |
| 04-2-7837 | 5 | 12 | 22 | 23 | 34 | 91 |
| 04-3-4866 | 6 | 16 | 30 | 18 | 32 | 96 |
| 04-4-7791 | 5 | 21 | 25 | 17 | 32 | 95 |
| 04-5-1391 | 4 | 10 | 22 | 16 | 37 | 85 |
| 04-6-0207 | 6 | 0 | 32 | 21 | 27 | 80 |
| 04-7-2068 | 5 | 0 | 37 | 29 | 28 | 94 |
| 04-8-2132 | 6 | 1 | 30 | 30 | 37 | 98 |
| 04-9-7837 | 7 | 19 | 24 | 21 | 40 | 104 |
| 04-10-4866 | 13 | 5 | 32 | 25 | 42 | 104 |
| 04-11-7791 | 6 | 13 | 30 | 28 | 21 | 92 |
| 04-12-0964 | 7 | 12 | 28 | 27 | 30 | 97 |
| 04-13-1391 | 7 | 0 | 30 | 28 | 43 | 101 |
| 04-14-0207 | 9 | 6 | 36 | 26 | 21 | 89 |
| 04-15-2068 | 9 | 15 | 23 | 23 | 37 | 98 |
| 04-16-2132 | 5 | 0 | 35 | 29 | 25 | 89 |
| 04-17-7880 | 5 | 5 | 23 | 28 | 44 | 100 |
| 04-18-1398 | 4 | 7 | 28 | 27 | 33 | 95 |
| TOTAL | 109 | 222 | 487 | 416 | 563 | 1688 |

5 MAY 1991

| FLIGHT # | #FAM | #SINGLE | #MALE | #FEMALE | #CHILD | TOTAL |
|------------|------|---------|-------|---------|--------|-------|
| 05-01-0964 | 7 | 10 | 20 | 19 | 46 | 95 |
| 05-02-4866 | 7 | 3 | 38 | 30 | 36 | 107 |
| 05-03-7803 | 3 | 12 | 34 | 27 | 32 | 105 |
| 05-04-0213 | 4 | 6 | 37 | 26 | 27 | 96 |
| 05-05-2061 | 3 | 12 | 37 | 22 | 28 | 99 |
| 05-06-1391 | 4 | 6 | 44 | 19 | 28 | 97 |
| 05-07-0209 | 4 | 11 | 25 | 28 | 40 | 104 |
| 05-08-7791 | 5 | 17 | 27 | 25 | 39 | 108 |
| 05-09-0964 | 1 | 3 | 31 | 28 | 40 | 102 |
| 05-10-4866 | 8 | 8 | 44 | 28 | 25 | 105 |
| 05-11-0213 | 8 | 10 | 26 | 22 | 36 | 94 |
| 05-12-2061 | 7 | 16 | 25 | 19 | 48 | 108 |
| 05-13-0209 | 8 | 3 | 22 | 33 | 47 | 105 |
| 05-14-7791 | 5 | 14 | 23 | 26 | 45 | 108 |
| 05-15-0497 | 5 | 22 | 18 | 23 | 49 | 112 |
| 05-16-2132 | 8 | 5 | 19 | 30 | 46 | 100 |
| 05-17-0209 | 6 | 0 | 29 | 26 | 50 | 105 |
| TOTAL | 97 | 147 | 489 | 431 | 662 | 1750 |

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-------------|-----------------------|-------------|----------------------|-------------|-------------|
| OVERALL: | 509 | 1564 | 1993 | 1553 | 2342 | 7474 |
| OVERALL MRE'S: | 3235 | OVERALL WATER: | 8307 | OVERALL MORES | 3650 | |

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: Division Flank Screen from LD to Phase Line BERLIN

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 241200(C)FEB91 to 260001(C)FEB91.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

On 241500(C)FEB91, Task Force 5-5 split into two elements 20 KM from the LD. Task Force(-) consisting of A Co., Team B, Team D, Scout HQ, Mortar Section, CBT Trains(-) and TAC(+) moved to conduct the division flank screen and maintain contact with 4-7 CAV. On 250600(C)FEB91, Task Force(-) under the command of MAJ THOMAS GROSS, S-3, reconned forward and crested the LD at 0830 using lanes 34, 35 and 36. The scout HQ section, led by 1LT WINTERS, made initial contact with 4-7 CAV at the LD. The 4-7 CAV contact could not give the disposition of the Squadron in the screen or the 1ID on our right. MAJ GROSS decided to move forward to Phase Line APPLE to establish contact with 4-7 CAV at Contact Point 101. Contact was made by the scout section at 1500 hours and the Task Force(-) was screening the division flank for 5 km from the CP to DREAR.

At 1600, Team BRAVO, lead element in the screen, observed several dismounts. They had captured three, when about 30-50 more appeared 1200 meters to their flank. This force was armed and MAJ GROSS authorized CPT GEORGE, Team B Commander, to fire warning shots, believing they would then surrender. At this time, 3 vehicles appeared on the right flank. They were later identified as Bradleys and MAJ GROSS issued a check fire. MAJ GROSS contacted the 4-7 CAV and warned them of the enemy force in their sector. 4-7 CAV acknowledged and said they would take care of them.

Upon Task Force(-) arrival at CP 101, the 42 FA Brigade had moved through from the 1ID sector into the 3AD sector. This was one of the CG's indicators that the division right flank was secure. The Task Force Commander instructed Task Force(-) to continue the screen to vicinity Phase Line BERLIN and link up with TEAM RIESS. At 2200, Team B encountered three enemy soldiers. They approached them and they immediately surrendered. At 2300, Team B captured 4 more EPWs. At 260001FEB91, the Task Force(-) linked up with TEAM RIESS and began preparation for the next mission.

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: EPW Handling and Dismounted Actions.

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 241200(C)FEB91 to 280801(C)FEB91.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

The first 4 EPWs taken by the Task Force were captured by 3d Platoon, Team BRAVO on 25FEB91. SSG CHANEY, dismounted squad leader, stated all four EPWs were carrying their boots and were dragging MRE on a string like a stringer full of fish. They also had bottled water in a bag and carried surrender leaflets. The EPWs after surrendering immediately began repeating the war cry of the disintegrating Iraqi Army, "Number 3, Hamburger!"

All 25 EPWs for the day were loaded in a 2 1/2 TN truck with SPC BARRETT and PFC ABERNATHY assigned as guards. The EPWs were glad to be out of the war and a LT spoke English. He shared with the guards his knowledge of such important aspects of American life as: Michael Jackson, Elvis Presley and Mohammad Ali. The EPW truck spent the night of 25/26 FEB 91 with 2/29 FA. Overnight one prisoner got loose and released the other prisoners. In the morning, to the guards' surprise, the EPWs were sitting in the back of the truck, hands loose, smiling and offering them cigarettes. To simplify passage, the guards instructed the EPWs, "If approached by an officer or NCO, place their hands behind their backs as if still tied." On 26 FEB 91, the EPWs were delivered to MPs and SPC BARRETT and PFC ABERNATHY began their journey north to link up with the Task Force.

They found the Ready First Combat Team (1st Brigade) and began moving with them. However, their newly gained expertise was identified and they were assigned to transport another group of 12 EPWs (one Captain) back to an EPW compound. These EPWs were not tied and like the previous EPWs were extremely friendly and glad to be going to Saudi Arabia. On 27 FEB 91, SPC BARRETT and PFC ABERNATHY delivered their second load of prisoners and began moving north to seek the Task Force. Again, they linked up with the RFCT. At one point, the column was conducting a passage through a minefield. Just recently, a tank had been hit by an RPG-7 in the lane. The Captain in charge gave orders to shoot any enemy identified in the area because of the high threat. PFC ABERNATHY identified an enemy soldier during this passage and shooting him in the hip rendered him combat ineffective. Throughout this mission, SPC BARRETT and PFC ABERNATHY traveled with numerous units, back and forth in still barely held territory and managed to accomplish the mission with little assistance.

(Based on interviews with CPT Keith George, Commander B/5-5; SSG Jones, SSG Jacque Chaney, SPC Barrett and PFC Abernathy, B/5-5.

In unrelated incidents during the Task Force movement, B33 again stopped to take prisoners. SSG JONES, BC, gave the order, "Dismount!" The Iraqi soldiers heard his command and immediately began cringing and crying out, "Please, No dismount! Salaam! Please, No dismount! Salaam!" These soldiers had an intense fear of the American dismounted soldier that they had learned at the hands of the 2d ACR.

On the night of 26FEB91, due to rain and the poor condition of the EPWs, BRAVO Team used an ambulance to shelter and transport EPWs. The EPWs were placed face down on stretchers and secured with patient restraints in the back of a M113 ambulance. This expedient sufficed until the EPWs became too numerous and the Task Force medic truck, towing a water trailer, driven by SSG SPRAYBERRY came forward and was filled with the EPWs.

(Based on interview with SSG Jacque Chaney, B/5-5 CAV.

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: Divisional Follow and Support Mission.

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 241200(C)FEB91 to 261700(C)FEB91.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

Task Force 5-5 having been assigned the two divergent missions of divisional follow and support and divisional flank screen, created TEAM RIESS. Task Force(-) was assigned the flank screen with TEAM RIESS performing the follow and support mission. TEAM RIESS was composed of C/5-5; A Sect, Mortars; 2 Stinger Teams; TOC (-) and a slice of CBT Trains under the control of the BN XO, MAJ RIESS. At 251000(C)FEB91, 20 KM south of the LD, the Task Force split and TEAM RIESS began leading the 8 columns of DREAR/DISCOM (1045 wheeled vehicles) north along MSR BURGUNDY toward OBJ COLLINS. Upon crossing the LD, LTC DEEGAN assumed control of TEAM RIESS and directed a scout section to screen to the north and identify the best avenue of advance for the wheels in DREAR/DISCOM. Approximately 241800(C) TEAM RIESS halted vicinity Phase Line BERLIN and awaited link up with the Task Force(-). Link up occurred at 260001FEB91 and TEAM RIESS returned to Task Force control.

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

CPT Shaffer, Commander C Co; LTC Deegan, Commander Task Force 5-5 CAV; MAJ Riess, XO Task Force 5-5 CAV; MSG Mack, PSG Mortar PLT.

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: Divisional Follow and Support mission from Phase Line BERLIN to OBJ COLLINS.

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 260001(C)FEB91 to 261700(C)FEB91

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

Task Force 5-5 having completed the flank screen conducted a link up at 260001(C)FEB91 just short of Phase Line BERLIN. Task Force 5-5 CAV provided security for the division rear. Team BRAVO tied into RFCT in the east; A Co tied into 2d Brigade in the west with Team DELTA in between to establish a cup behind DREAR/DISCOM during the night of 25/26 FEB. SP the next day at 260800(C)FEB91 was in a Task Force diamond. The Task Force rapidly led DREAR/DISCOM to the site of the DSA in OBJ COLLINS. This mission was accomplished in such a rapid manner that the DSA was set before the maneuver brigades were in position on OBJ COLLINS. The Task Force was then attached back to the RFCT.

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

LTC Deegan, MAJ Riess, MAJ Gross, CPT Wiker, 5-5 CAV

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: Team D/5-5 CAV captures EPWs and destroys T-62.

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 271730(C)FEB91 to 271900(C)FEB91.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

Shortly after crossing Phase Line PLUM (Iraq-Kuwait Border), Team DELTA identified 4 enemy standing in waist deep fighting positions on the task force left flank. SGT KROGMAN, gunner on D66, placed his cross hairs on the forehead of one enemy soldier and lased the distance as 320 meters. SGT KROGMAN charged his coax and prepared to support the infantry platoon of TEAM DELTA as they dismounted to secure the prisoners. Eleven EPWs (one Captain) were captured; three of which had minor injuries, which the infantry platoon medic treated. All the EPWs were barefoot. The captured captain, informed CPT MARKWOOD, Team DELTA Commander, they expected to be killed rather than captured, and Muslim custom prefers death with your boots off. He also said they had walked 50 km the last two days.

While TEAM DELTA was occupied with this action, the remainder of the Task Force made contact with an enemy platoon (see report of Task Force Action). CPT MARKWOOD left a Bradley platoon and Abrams platoon under 1LT GRIFFITHS, XO and took two tank platoons forward to support the task force as needed. Team DELTA gathered the enemy weapons and destroyed them with two thermite grenades. The EPWs were bound and left with food and water.

Following the above actions, the Task Force had moved 3-4 km, when SGT KROGMAN, gunner D66, identified a "hot" T-62. CPT MARKWOOD requested and received permission to engage. As CPT MARKWOOD turned to give the order, his gunner PFC DEABENDERFUR was standing ready with a sabot round and smiling. The crew of the DEVASTATOR (D66) engaged from 560 meters. The penetrator struck at the turret ring and passed completely through the tank "without even slowing down." This resulted in a series of secondary explosions blowing the turret off the T-62 tank.

(Based on interview with CPT Chris Markwood, Commander D/4-32 AR.

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

PFC Copeland, Driver D66, D/4-32 AR.

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: Enemy contact of Task Force.

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 271900(C)FEB91 to 272030(C)FEB91.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

After the Task Force came around a small hill, TEAM BRAVO reported enemy dismounts, 2 T72 and 2 BMPs on the ridge to the north (left flank). SSG MULDOWNNEY, TC on B23, an engineer M113 from 2/B/23 EN, was monitoring the Task Force command net, heard the reports of the enemy and shifted left to protect the TOC when the Task Force halted. SSG MULDOWNNEY, SPC MURRELL and SPC MORRIS (2/B/23 EN) all were wearing NVG's and identified several personnel moving along the ridge 150 meters away as enemy. The crew of B23 (23 EN) clearly identified one stationary individual. TEAM BRAVO identified the individual as an RPG gunner and opened fire on this gunner with 25 mm HE and began suppressing a shallow trench with approximately 300 HE rounds. SSG MULDOWNNEY, B23 also fired on the individual identified as an RPG firer. Meanwhile, SGT NICHOLAS, SL HQ42, Mortar Platoon, began to receive enemy fire, seven rounds striking his track and he opened fire with a .50 cal machinegun. The Mortar Platoon, under the control of 1LT HYNDS, opened fire on 18 enemy seen moving toward their position. HB101 M113 2-3 FA Fire Support Element (FSE) vehicle, with the TAC also opened fire on the enemy position. At this same time, an anti-armor team engaged the stationary TOC with RPG fire (SEE ATTACHED REPORT). SSG MULDOWNNEY then racked .50 cal fire up and down the ridge where the enemy had been observed until CPT GEORGE, B CO Commander, requested all elements to his rear to cease-fire over the Task Force net. At this time 2D platoons' dismounts began to move forward. SGT CURTIS, TC B22, an engineer M113 from 2/B/23 moving with TEAM BRAVO. SGT CURTIS's vehicle halted parallel to the enemy bunkers and monitored the battle. After the fire ceased, CPT GEORGE repeatedly urged 2d platoon forward to close with the enemy. The dismounted elements were poised to assault when a white sheet appeared, signally surrender. More EPWs continued to emerge and 3d platoon was requested to reinforce. TEAM BRAVO took 30 EPW's, most emerging from a sleeping bunker. A captured enemy LT when asked why they did not fight back told CPT GEORGE, "You were like the wind. You come, blow and go away. You cannot shot the wind." He also said his unit had spent the last two days walking. Closer inspection showed that only the BMP and 2 OPs were manned. The BMP was engaged when the gunner began manually transversing the turret. All EPW's were bound and left for follow on forces. The task force then resumed its movement.

For details of Team Bravo engagement see attached statement from 1LT Anderson, Phase Line 2d Platoon, Team Bravo.

(Based on interviews with CPT George, B/5-5; 1LT Hynds, SGT Crider, Mortars, 5-5; SSG Muldownney, SGT Curtis, B/23 EN

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

1LT Anderson, B/5-5 CAV

2d PLATOON BRAVO COMPANY CONTACT

On 27 Feb 91 at 2130 hours 2d Platoon Bravo Company reported T72 Tanks and dismounts to the left flank of the company. On order, B23 launched a TOW missile to recon by fire. The TOW was launched with no enemy response. B24 reports four (4) dismounts to the left flank.

Received the order to investigate. Platoon was brought on line, B24 fired at Bunker located (3). The following is a breakdown of the actions of each crew and dismount squad.

21 - Engaged a BTR that looked "Hot" (5). Shifted right to identify dismounts with weapons moving into bunker. Engaged bunker (8). Shifted right to dismounts moving into bunker, engaged bunker (9). Shifted left to bunker on left (8). Shifted right to bunker (9). Saw flag appear; order was given to cease fire.

23 - Engaged bunker (9). Engaged BMP (13), 1 dismount ran from BMP to left towards bunkers. Engaged dismounts. Engaged Recovery Vehicle (12). Shifted back to Bunker (9, 10) and BTR 60 (1); saw movement and engaged. BC of 23 took off CVC to give instructions to dismount Squad Leader; heard "whizzing" from his left.

24 - ID and engaged 4 personnel at Bunker (3). Engaged BMP (2) and already destroyed Tank; moved back to Bunker (3). Heard our radio to cease fire because of EPW with flag. Located EPW Bunker (9).

66 - ID and engaged dismounts moving towards Bunker with RPG (8).

Dismounts were on ground behind Bradleys at C moving to D.

| | | |
|------------|--------------|--------------|
| ^ | ^ | ^ |
| 21 | 24 | 23 |
| SSG Malone | CPL Backhaus | SGT Johnson |
| CPL Sell | CPL Zabel | CPL Matthews |

2d Squad Leader, SSG Malone, reported AK fire he heard at 1 O'clock position. CPL Sell saw tracer rounds fired just on the right of 24 coming from Bunker (9). SGT Johnson, 3d Squad Leader saw tracers to his left and hears "Whizzing". CPL Zabel heard the whizzing also.

Once Bradley's reached limit of advance, EPW's started coming out of Bunker (9). B24 covered EPW's; B21 scanned left; B23 scanned right flank. SGT Johnson and A Team, 3d Squad provided vehicle security. SSG Malone and Squad with B Team of 3rd Squad approached EPW's. Got them on the ground and began to bound prisoners. After all EPW's were bounded, CPL Backhaus, PFC Abbot, SPC Johnson, Johnson searched immediate surroundings. Thermite grenade was thrown into Bunker (9).

28 EPW's were bound, counted by CPL Sell; EPW's info:

1. Some were not wearing shoes
2. Some had pants on backwards
3. Some had jackets with no shirt under.

After receiving order to move, CPL Sell with SFC Applequist, PFC Santiago, SSG Malone apprehended two dismounts with AK Folding Stocks. CPL Sell dropped weapons and mounted as we had order to move. Total EPW's was 30.

21, 23, 24, 66 are Vehicle Bumper Numbers

> Represents direction of Hull during movement A,B,C,D sequence of moves of mounted.

- (1) a BTR 60 engaged by 23
- (2) BMP engage by 24
- (3) Bunker w/troops engaged by 24
- (4) Tank - 10 by 24 already destroyed
- (5) a BTR engaged by 21
- (6) T72 ID by 21 & 23
- (7) T72 ID by 21 & 23 engaged w/TOW by 23
- (8) Bunker w/Troops engaged by 21 & 66
- (9) Bunker w/Troops engaged by 21 & 23; 28 EPWs surrendered; AK fire heard by SSG Malone, tracer rounds seen by CPL Sell, CPL Zabel heard "whizzing" SGT Johnson to his left.
- (10) ID Bunker by CPL Backhaus, PFC Abbot, SPC Johnson, J.
- (11) ID Bunker " " "
- (12) Recovery vehicle was engaged by 23
- (13) BMP engaged by 23
- (14) EPW Collection Point

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: RPG Attack on the Battalion TOC

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 271830(C)FEB91

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

While Task Force 5-5 was involved in the fight on the left flank, the Task Force TOC vehicles came under an anti-armor ambush from the right flank. Once the Task Force formation became stationary in a column facing east and attention was focused on the engagement on the left flank, an two-man RPG team fired from less than 200 meters against the three stationary M577 vehicles in the TOC. SPC SPEARS, driver HB102 (FSE M577), saw the rocket grenade narrowly miss the front of HQ13 (S-3 M577). A warning was issued by the TC HQ13 and the crew of HQ13 evacuated the vehicle with the exception of CPT WYMAN. SFC DONAHUE dismounted with the M60 machinegun from HQ13. CPT WYMAN remained in the vehicle on the Task Force command net and requested a SITREP as the fighting continued from 1LT CHRISTMER, TEAM BRAVO XO. 1LT CHRISTMER correctly reported the Task Force was facing 2 T55's and 2 BMPs. At this time, due to the lack of enemy tracers and the volume of friendly fire it was incorrectly reported that no enemy fire was being received. CPT WYMAN updated the situation to brigade.

(Based on interviews with SPC Holland, HB100, Fire Support Team (FIST); SPC Spears, HB102 FIST; PFC Purdue, HQ35, S-3 Section.)

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

MSG Mack, Mortars; SFC Donahue, SSG Starkey, SPC Scott, S-3 Section;

As the Task Force began movement following the engagement on the left flank. Due to the fluid enemy situation, SFC OXENRIDER had PFC PURDUE (HQ35 2 1/2 TN Truck, S-3 Section) begin to scan with PVS-7Bs. The Task Force had haltingly begun to move when SFC OXENRIDER saw a rocket streak across the TOC formation from south to north (right to left). He directed PFC PURDUE's attention to the area the missile came from (Approximately the same area the earlier RPG round had come from). PFC SCHOOLMEISTER, driver HQ12, S-2 track, had early seen 3 figures in this same area and also saw a white flash behind his vehicle as they began moving. PFC PURDUE scanned the sector, observed two to three men and reported muzzle flashes. SFC OXENRIDER gave him permission to fire and PFC PURDUE drove the enemy away as the column continued to move.

(Based on interviews with SFC Oxenrider and PFC Purdue, S-3 Section; PFC Schoolmeister, S-2 Section; SPC Hines, SPC Holland HB100 FIST)

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

(None Listed)

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: LNO Activity with 4-7 CAV

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 232200(C)FEB91 to 252300(C)FEB91

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

On the night of 23FEB91, 2LT DUGAN (LNO) and SPC MAHAFFEY (driver, HQ31 HUMMV) arrived at the 4-7 CAV TOC. At 240900(C)FEB91 (G-Day), 4-7 CAV began movement to an attack position. The LNO moved with the LRSU detachment commanded by CPT VOLKESKY. At 1000, 4-7 CAV received a change of mission to continue movement to the LD. At 1200, 4-7 CAV crossed the LD/border. At 251200(C)FEB91, LNO began relaying disposition of Task Force 5-5 CAV to 4-7 CAV, coordinating the link up between elements of the two units at division CP216 vicinity Phase Line MELON. By 1300, a Scout section from Task Force 5-5 meet with the LNO and the 4-7 CAV M577. LT DUGAN remained at the contact point until 1630. During this time he continued to pass information on 4-7 CAV dispositions to MAJ GROSS, 5-5 CAV S-3, allowing Team BRAVO, 5-5 CAV to tie in with BRAVO TRP, 4-7 CAV along the screen. He also assisted the passage of lines of the 42d FA brigade from 1ID sector into 3AD sector. By 1630, LT DUGAN had lost radio contact with the Task Force due to distance. Their mission complete, they began an independent movement of 40 miles to link up with the Task Force. With only a compass and no radio contact, LT DUGAN and SPC MAHAFFEY traveled alone through barely secured territory. They found D/5-5 CAV (attached to Task Force 4-32 AR) and made contact with the Task Force, finally linking up at 252200(C)FEB91.

On the afternoon of 26 FEB 91 the Task Force was attached to 3d Brigade, 3AD. At 262330(C)FEB91, the LNO was dispatched to the 3d Brigade TOC to pick up a FRAGO for the movement east from OBJ COLLINS to OBJ MINDON. The LNO moved to the TOC 10 KM away while the division preparatory fires were going in for the upcoming advance. Upon arrival, LNO had the Battle Captain awoken and received a copy of the FRAGO. Due to the rapidly changing enemy situation several contingencies were being considered. Finally at 0330, 2d Brigade came into heavy contact and the CG directed 3 Brigade to pass through 2 Brigade on the morning of 27 FEB 91. At 0530, LT DUGAN had returned to the Task Force with a scheduled 0630 SP. LTC DEEGAN requested LT DUGAN to write down what was relevant to the Task Force mission. LT DUGAN extracted 6 bullets from the FRAGO which were then passed over the Task Force command net to the Company Commanders. LT DUGAN then converted the Brigade graphics from 1:50000 to 1:250000 and posted the Commander's map.

(Based on written report of and interview with 2LT DUGAN, LNO, S-3 Section.)

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

SPC Mahaffey, Driver, S-3 Section.

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: Scout Missions.

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 272200(C)FEB91

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

The Scout platoon mission was essentially to screen Task Force(-) right flank while conducting the divisional right flank screen as well as conduct coordination between 5-5 and 4-7 CAV and provide early warning of known or suspected enemy positions. During the operation, this plan changed with sections being assigned different missions.

Scout section missions were: B Section conducting left flank screen and coordination; A Section conducting right flank coordination and screen; HQ Section screen the task force front. Of interesting note - the Scout Platoon never operated as a platoon, but was split section the entire ground war.

On 24FEB91 (G-Day), the Task Force moved to cross the TAP line road. A Section initially moved with the 3AD CAB, ahead of the Task Force. On 25FEB91, A Section remained with the CAB, until the Task Force was 20 km south of the LD and split into Task Force(-) and TEAM RIESS. At this time B Section began moving with the CAB, and A section was OPCON to TEAM RIESS, screening to its front. HQ Section screened Task Force(-) along the division right boundary. Upon crossing Phase Line APPLE, HQ Section kicked out to conduct coordination with 4-7 CAV at CP 101. A Section remained OPCON to TEAM RIESS and B Section continued shadowing the CAB along MSR BURGUNDY, TEAM RIESS' axis of advance. Coordination with 4-7 CAV was completed at 1300 hours. At this same time, 42d FA Brigade passed into the 3AD sector after being DS to 1ID.

Both B and HQ Sections linked back up with Task Force(-) at approximately 1500, when the Task Force encountered its first enemy and captured 35 EPWs. Scouts continued to screen the Task Force (-) front and left flank to vicinity Phase Line BERLIN, which was the Task Force link up point at 260001(C)FEB91.

At 260600(C)FEB91, Scout platoon was ordered to move north through the Task Force AA and occupy a forward screen. The platoon was reunited briefly. However, A Section was soon sent to shadow 1st Brigade on the right and B Section shadowed 3d Brigade on the left. HQ Section maintained contact with 2d Brigade to the front until the Task Force completed its mission of closing DREAR on the DSA vicinity Phase Line MALTA.

At approximately 261700(C)FEB91, the Task Force began movement to Phase Line RIFLE to reattach to the 1st Brigade. However at 2030, was attached to 3d Brigade and Scout platoon (minus A Section with 1st Brigade) conducted coordination and manned a contact point with 5-18th IN (3d Brigade).

A Section having moved out of radio contact, attached itself in an OPCON status to Task Force 4-32 AR (1st Brigade). They were assisting 4-32 scouts in a forward left screen of that Task Force along the division boundary. At approximately 2100, 4-32 scouts reported direct fire contact with a T-62 tank and that one scout vehicle (HQ26) had been hit and sustained casualties. SSG SCHWANDT, A Section SECT SGT, reported to 4-32 Commander that a platoon of enemy dismounts were approaching the disabled HQ26, while two other vehicles were attempting to evacuate the wounded. After reporting for the 3d time, SSG SCHWANDT received permission to engage. The section used HE 25mm to suppress and disperse the enemy.

On 27FEB91 the scouts facilitated an "on the move" integration of the Task Force into the 3D Brigade column. The Task Force continued toward Phase Line PLUM where HQ Section reported a series of bunkers and the Task Force became involved in a firefight. B Section destroying 2 T-62 with TOWs. Upon completion of the action, the Task Force began moving and HQ Section reported 2 moving BMPs vicinity QU1109. Upon receiving permission to fire, one was destroyed with 25mm Sabot and the other with a TOW. The Scouts then manned a contact point with 5-18IN (3d BDE).

(Based on statement by 1LT Jeff Winters.)

On 28FEB91, after a change of mission to clear in zone west to Phase Line PLUM (Iraq-Kuwait Border). Scouts cleared a bunker complex, capturing 8 EPWs and destroying with demolitions 20 T-55 tanks, 2 MTLBs and 2 BRDMs.

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

1LT Jeff Winters, Acting Scout Platoon Leader; SGT Fulks; SGT Vargus; SFC Young; SSG Schwandt.

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: Security Platoon Activity.

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 271900(C)FEB91

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

Upon inactivation of Echo Company, 5-5 CAV, 4 M113s and 6 personnel were assigned to HHC to form the Security Platoon for the Field trains/Task Force MSR. During the Task Force movement to OBJ COLLINS, the Security Platoon escorted the Task Force combat trains. Upon closure on OBJ COLLINS and establishment of the DSA on 27 FEB 91, the Security Platoon was assigned the mission to escort the RFCT fuelers to the fuel point and catch them up as the division continued the pursuit. Due to the sandy conditions the Security Platoon had to frequently push, pull and tow the 5,000-gallon fuel tankers. They successfully linked up with the brigade's fuel, allowing the pursuit to continue through the night.

They were then assigned to escort the Task Force trains to link up with the Task Force. The Security Platoon used three tracks on line to clear three lanes, with one track forward to scout. While leading the trains to link up to the Task Force, they encountered a hasty protective minefield. SGT CARVER and SPC BARNETTE used a grappling hook to move satchels blocking the axis. Additionally, SPC PLOTKINS, driver HQ71, found a mine with three handgrenades under it surrounded by trip wires. After marking a breach, they linked up with the Task Force, just prior to the Task Force passing through 2d Brigade.

At the link up, SSG WARD, Security Platoon Leader (HQ71), observed an unknown number of vehicles approaching from the left (north). They watched as 4 Apaches arrived and engaged the vehicles with TOWs and rockets. SGT CARVER's team escorted the trains clear of the action, while SSG WARD's team screened and "watched the fireworks".

The Security Platoon continued to move with the trains during the night of 27FEB91. At Phase Line PLUM (Iraq-Kuwait Border), 12 wheeled tankers became stuck and the Security Platoon was dispatched to retrieve them. Upon recovery of these vehicles the Security Platoon was escorting them forward when 3 HEMMTs overturned their trailers. SGT CARVER, SPC BARNETTE (HQ73), SGT HOLMES and SPC DAVIS (HQ74) remained to assist the HEMMTs and provide security. The crew of HQ74 sighted 4-5 dismounts on a near by hill. HQ74 circled the hill to the left and sighted three buildings, as well as the enemy running back. After receiving permission from SGT CARVER, they fired several rounds to disperse the enemy and they fled to the buildings. HQ73 came around from the right side of the hill and observed the enemy in the buildings and began receiving fire from them (two rounds struck the vehicle inches below the driver, SPC BARNETTE). Concerned with hitting other friendly convoys in the area with .50 cal fire and keeping with their mission of recovery and escort, SGT CARVER held their fire and withdrew his section to the military crest of the hill. From this position, they keep the enemy under observation until the HEMMTs were ready to travel. This small firefight made a 20-minute solution out of what would have taken the HEMMT crews half a night to fix.

On the morning of 28 FEB 91, the Security Platoon located and cleared several bunkers and 152 mm Howitzers. On the afternoon of 28 FEB 91, SGT CARVER, SPC BARNETTE, SPC BURRIS, SPC DAVIS and SPC THRASH (commo) took a section to LOGBASE ECHO to recovery vehicles and equipment left behind during the attack. This section traveled 300 km back through Iraqi territory during the initial hours of the cease fire, while mopping up operations were just beginning. The section arrived in SAUDI ARABIA on 1 MAR 91 and linked up with an M1, M2, MKTs and the remainder of the Field Trains. On 3 March, SGT CARVER's section began leading the 300-KM movement back to OBJ MINDON. The element arrived in KUWAIT on the morning of 4 March 1991. The Security Platoon continued to provide security to the Task Force Trains, as well as lead and escort logistics runs.

(Based on interviews with SSG Ward and SGT Carver, HHC).

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: NBC preparation for DESERT STORM.

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 5 January 1991 to 2 March 1991.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

Deploying to Saudi Arabia for Operation Desert Shield, 5-5 CAV mission was to be capable if surviving and fighting in a NBC Environment. The BN accomplished this preparation in several stages. All company NBC teams were recertified and all soldiers participated in basic soldier skill training in NBC protection. To insure soldiers knew these skills the battalion conducted company-wide NBC training and Mask confidence exercises.

Each company reached 130% in personnel strength and surprisingly 1LT PIGMAN, NBC Officer, secured a 15% average increase in protective masks while the Division logistics channels were closed. Also before deployment, he and SGT PORTIS, BN NBC NCO, gained 5 chemical agent alarms, 12 radiation detectors and countless decontamination devices and filled shortages within each company. As an end result, the battalion deployed combat effective in detecting both nuclear and chemical hazards.

The training undergone both in Germany and during deployment was invaluable. This training was used in combat, for example at FAA BAYONET, SCUD missiles were fired and the scouts and C Co. NBC teams conducted M256 kit tests. Test showed negative results, but each team conducted a point survey in a smooth and timely manner.

Soldiers of Task Force 5-5 CAV in OPERATION DESERT STORM faced an enemy who had previously used weapons of mass destruction. Iraqi's chemical arsenal included G series nerve (contact and vapor hazard) and mustard agents (very persistent vapor and contact hazard). With this threat, 1LT PIGMAN (NBC Officer) developed two plans to conduct decontamination. One plan involved the decontamination of vehicles without use of water. The Brigade and the Division policy were weathering. This was merely a stop gap measure, since mustard contamination must be removed. 1LT PIGMAN's solution was to apply DS2 to vehicles and use sand to absorb the corrosive decontaminate from the vehicle. Another problem was casualty decontamination. The solution was walking wounded go through a modified MOPP gear exchange and litter patients would be washed in a bleach solution.

NBC status, during Operation Desert Storm and Shield, never fell below standard. Due to a shortage of wheeled vehicles, 1LT PIGMAN would frequently walk through the desert to each company to check company NBC status while in TAA HENRY. 1LT PIGMAN also acted as driver and TC for THE STEED (S-3 Section CUCV) during the Task Force advance through Iraq to Kuwait.

(Based on statement by 1LT Pigman, BN NBC Officer.)

OTHER PERSONS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

SGT Portis, BN NBC NCO

REPORT AUTHOR: Captain Steven G. Wyman

UNIT: Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

ACTIVITY/EVENT: Engineer Mopping up Operations.

DATE/TIME OF ACTIVITY/EVENT: 280800(C)FEB91 to 2MAR91.

DESCRIPTION OF ACTIVITY/EVENT:

On the morning of 28 FEB 91, the Task Force awoke to find itself surrounded by an assortment of artillery and support units. In the center of this mass of combat power sat a command BMP, barely noticed the night prior. This became the first and most famous demolition for the Engineer Platoon. After driving away the scavengers and the curious, the engineers still had to convince the artillery battalion to move back a safe distance. Once the vehicle was wired with explosives none other than PAO arrived with a CBS camera crew. After filming the demolition and subsequent secondary explosions, they interviewed the engineer squad. This film later appeared both on AFN and CBS News.

About 021430(C)MAR91, SPC STILEN (B/23 EN) was wounded from an Iraqi grenade fuze. During engineer clearing operations, SPC SMITH moved a box near a bunker and began walking away. The box contained a grenade fuze that detonated. Fuze shrapnel of debris entered his left calf. On site a medic treated the wound and he was next seen by CW2 CARSON, who referred him to the Brigade aid station for further treatment. From there he was evacuated to 154 Field Hospital on 3 March for treatment. On 5 March, SPC STILEN was evacuated to Germany.

(Based on statements from 1LT Mark R. Blackburn, Platoon Leader, B/23 EN and SGT Gary D. Curtis, SQD Leader, B/23 EN)